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SECURITIES FRAUD: RULE 1Ob-5 DOES NOT REQUIRE FAIRNESS
IN SHORT-FORM MERGERS WHEN FULL DISCLOSURE IS MADE
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977)
Respondents,1 minority stockholders, brought a derivative action under
SEC rule l0b5 2 seeking to set aside a merger s effected pursuant to the Delaware short-form merger statute 4 or alternatively, to recover the fair value
of their shares. The Delaware statute permits a parent company owning at
least ninety percent of the stock of a subsidiary to buy out the minority
interest without prior notice or justifiable business purpose.5 Unsatisfied
with the price offered by the majority( and finding the state remedy inadequate,7 respondents invoked lOb-5 alleging that despite full disclosure,
1. Respondents were minority shareholders of Kirby Lumber Corporation. Santa Fe
Industries owned 95% of the shares of Kirby through its wholly owned subsidiary, Santa
Fe Natural Resources, Inc. 97 S. Ct. 1292, 1296 S. n.2, 1297 (1977).
2. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1976), which was promulgated under section 10b
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970), provides:
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security."
3. The merger in this case was actually the elimination of minority stockholders by
the use of a dummy corporation, Forest Products, Inc., which was organized under Delaware
law. The Kirby stock, together with cash, was transferred from Santa Fe's wholly owned
subsidiary to Forest in exchange for all of the latter's stock. The cash transferred to Forest
was used to make the purchase offer for the minority shares. The new corporation was
then merged into Kirby with Kirby as the surviving corporation. 97 S. Ct. at 1297 n.3.
4. DEL, CODE tit. 8, §253 (1975).
5. MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943) (no business
purpose needed); Carl Marks & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 391, 233
A.2d 63 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (prior notice not required). Thirty-eight other states have similar
short-form statutes with premerger ownership requirements ranging from 80% (Nebraska)
to 99% (Illinois). This procedure can be contrasted with the normal long-form merger
procedure which requires that minority stockholders be given opportunity to be heard
and that a valid business purpose for the merger exist.
6. The statute permits the majority stockholder to set the price at any desired figure,
subject to the minority's appraisal remedy. DEL. CODE tit. 8, §262 (1975). The majority
shareholder in this case offered $150 per share based on an appraisal by Morgan, Stanley
and Company, an investment banking firm. Respondents claimed the stock was worth at
least $772 per share, calculated by the pro rata value of the physical assets. 97 S. Ct. at
1297.
7. The statute provides that upon petition to the Delaware Court of Chancery, the
minority stockholder may have an independent appraisal of the stock's fair value. DEL. CODE
tit. 8, §262 (1975). For a general discussion of the effectiveness of this remedy, see Brudney,
A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. Riv. 1019, 1023-25 (1975). See also text accompanying
notes 78-83 infra.
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the gross undervaluation of their shares and lack of prior notice and justifiable
business purpose constituted fraudulent conduct. The district court dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim." A divided court of appeals reversed,9 holding that a complaint states a claim if, in connection with a Delaware short-form merger, it alleges a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty
to deal fairly with minority shareholders, even absent a charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure1 ° The Supreme Court reversed" and
HELD, that a cause of action based on a breach of fiduciary duty under
any part of lOb-5 must allege manipulative or deceptive conduct within the
2
meaning of the rule.1

In an attempt to ascertain the causes of the financial debacle of the
1930's, Congress conducted an investigations that revealed widespread fraud,
manipulation, and victimization of investors in securities transactions. Legislative responses to these abuses included 14 the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,15 which contained the specific antifraud provisions16 that resulted in
the promulgation of SEC rule lOb-5. From the brief, general language of the
rule has come the largest segment of securities law1 encompassing a wide
range of transactions.' 8 This development occurred primarily in the lower

8. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The district
court held that the complaint was insufficient to state a federal claim for two reasons: (1)
with regard to the gross undervaluation of the shares, if "full and fair disclosure is made,
transactions eliminating minority interests are beyond the purview of Rule lOb-5"; and
(2) federal law does not require justifiable business purpose or prior notice in short-form
mergers. Id.
9. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). For a discussion of
the Second Circuit's decision, see Comment, "Going Private"- The Insider's Fiduciary Duty
and Rule lOb-5: Is Fairness Requisite?, 28 BAYLOR L. Rev. 565 (1976); Comment, Going
Private and Rule lOb-5: The Green and Marshel Decisions, 47 Miss. L.J. 981 (1976).
10. 533 F.2d at 1289.
11. 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
12. Id. at 1301.
13. See generally Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong. (1933).
For an official summary of the investigation and its accomplishments, see STOCK EXCHANGE
PsRtAcTicEs, S. REp. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 427 (1934).
14. Other examples of New Deal securities legislation are: Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §77a (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §79p (1970); and Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80b (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. §78a (1970).
16. 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970). The statute provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person...
"(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."
17. Although the rule remained in relative obscurity in the years immediately following
its passage, it is now the most widely litigated securities provision. Jacobs, The Role of
Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 27, 29 (1973).
18. The Supreme Court has characterized the development of lob-5 as "a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
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courts.1 0 Only in its most recent decisions20 has the Supreme Court attempted
to limit application of the rule by defining the conduct proscribed.
The most significant aspect of the growth of lOb-5 was the recognition of
a private cause of action.2 1 While the rule does not provide for private suits,
nor does it appear that Congress envisioned them, 22 the courts were quick to
23
find an implied private cause of action. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,24

the class of plaintiffs with standing to sue under the rule was limited, however,
to actual purchasers and sellers of securities. In addition, Birnbaum attempted
to limit causes of action to fraudulent practices normally associated with se25
curities transactions.
Despite the admonition in Birnbaum that "fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs" 28 was not proscribed by the rule, it was not long before
lOb-5 actions successfully entered the boardroom. The initial inroads were
derivative suits by minority stockholders alleging that directors had defrauded
2
The Supreme Court encouraged this inclusion of intracorporate
corporationsY.
affairs when it held that an investment adviser was a fiduciary with a duty to
disclose self-dealing.2 8 In discussing the nature and purpose of securities
legislation, the Court stressed that the law should be read "not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." 29 In response to
this mandate, the Second Circuit expanded the reach of lOb-5 to cover minority
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). A complete discussion of the scope of lOb-5 is found
in A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw; FRAUD (1957).
19. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has been the leading court in lob-5 litigation.
Justice Blackmun recognized this leadership by terming the Second Circuit the "Mother
Court" in securities litigation. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762
(1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. See text accompanying notes 39-44 infra. For a general discussion of the recent
Supreme Court trend, see Comment, Rule 10b-5: Scienter a Prerequisitefor Civil Liability,
22 LoYoLA L. REv. 874 (1976); Comment, Securities Regulation - Standing to Sue Under
Rule 10-5 - Supreme Court Adopts Birnbaum Doctrine, 41 Mo. L. Rav. 296 (1976).
21. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). For a discussion
of the impact of Kardon, see Note, New Civil Liabilities Under Securities and Exchange
Act Rules, 14 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 471 (1947).
22. 69 F. Supp. at 513. For a discussion of the private cause of action under lOb-5,
see Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The Case for Its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation Law,
37 U. CIN. L. Rav. 727, 729-32 (1968).
23. 69 F. Supp. at 514. The court reasoned that recognition of a private cause of

action would facilitate better enforcement of SEC rules. Kardon was followed without
question by all the federal courts and was finally affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1972).
24. 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). See Comment, Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-ZOB-5 - Guided Missile or Flying Saucer?, 32 TEX. L.
Rav. 197 (1953).
25. 193 F.2d at 464. The court did not elaborate on what types of fraud were governed
by the rule, but stated only that "fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs" was
not within the scope of the rule.
26. Id.
27. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Pappas v. Moss,
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
28. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
29. Id. at 195.
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stockholders who were being frozen out by means of a deceptive short-form
merger.3 0 Though the plaintiffs had not sold their stock, the court found that
they were sellers for purposes of the rule since they had no choice but to
3x
accept the majority's cash offer or pursue appraisal remedies.
The Supreme Court delved more deeply into corporate mismanagement
when it held that a deceptive scheme in which a corporate officer misappropriated the proceeds of a sale of treasury bonds was within the purview of lOb-5,
although the transaction did not touch an organized securities market and the
32
fraudulent conduct occurred after the securities transaction was completed.
The decision was based on the majority stockholders' duty to protect creditors
and minority stockholders. 33 The Court also recognized that lOb-5 is not
limited to protection of the integrity of securities markets, but should protect
3 4
against all instances of fraud involving the sale or purchase of securities.
The Second Circuit in Popkin v. Bishop,35 a case factually similar to the
instant case, placed some limitation on the fiduciary duty owed by majority
stockholders. The plaintiff in Popkin, facing elimination by a long-form
merger, invoked the rule and alleged gross undervaluation of his shares.3 6 In
dismissing the action, the court held that if a justifiable business purpose
for the merger exists,37 nondisclosure is an essential element in lOb-5 actions,
but once disclosure is made, the court will not become enmeshed in the terms
of the merger.38
Recent Supreme Court decisions have restricted general application of
lOb-5 in attempting to define more clearly the conduct proscribed by the
rule. Though still acknowledging the policy of effectuating remedial
purposes,39 the Court has shifted emphasis to a close reading of the statutory
language.40 The first of these cases affirmed the often criticized-' Birnbaum rule
30.

Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). Accord, Voege v. American

Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
31. 374 F.2d at 634.
32. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
33. Id. at 12. See also Comment, Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life: Through
the Looking Glass, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 930 (1973).
34. 404 U.S. at 12.
35. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 717. Popkin is distinguishable from the instant case by the justifiable business
purpose - merger was required by a court order in previous litigation - and the requirement under the long-form merger that minority stockholders have the opportunity to vote
on the proposed merger.
37. The court distinguished long- and short-form mergers and stated that in the
latter, it makes sense "to concentrate on the impropriety of the conduct itself rather
than on the 'failure to disclose' it, because full and fair disclosure in a real sense will
rarely occur." Id. at 719.
38. Id. at 720.
39. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976).
40. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). "The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language
itself." Id. Justice Powell's concurring opinion was given great weight by the majority in the
instant case.
41. See, e.g., Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 49 TEx. L.
REV. 617 (1971); Lowewgels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
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in which the Court limited the class of potential plaintiffs by strict adherence
to tile "purchase or sale" requirement. 42 The Court further limited lOb-5 by
placing negligent conduct beyond the scope of the rule in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder.43 The Court reasoned that the absence of a clear provision dealing
with negligent conduct indicated that Congress did not intend to create
liability for unintentional acts.The instant case applied the Court's new emphasis on strict construction
to breaches of fiduciary duty. 45 In reversing the Second Circuit's decision,46
however, the Court went beyond the context of fiduciary duty to hold that
in the absence of manipulation or deception, no cause of action exists under
rule lOb-5. 47 Justice White, speaking for the majority,- based the decision
on a strict interpretation of the statutory language, supplemented with a
discussion of policy considerations.
The Court stressed the importance of a close reading of the statutory
language to ascertain the fraudulent conduct Congress intended lOb-5 to
cover.419 The Court reasoned that because the statutory language speaks clearly
in terms of manipulation and deception and the rule's history reveals no
expansive intent, its scope should not be extended.5° Quoting Hochfelder,
the majority stated that the inclusion of all breaches of fiduciary duty witfiin
the rule's concept of fraud would "add a gloss to the operative language of
the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning." 51
The Court concluded that the transaction involved in the instant case
was not deceptive because there were no allegations of either misrepresentation
1Ob-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment,
23 ALA. L. Rlv. 543 (1971).
42. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975). See Comment,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the Purchaser-SellerProblem,
70 Nw. U.L. Rv. 965 (1976).
43. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). This case resolved the long-standing controversy in the lower
courts as to whether scienter was a necessary element in lOb-5 actions. Compare White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) ("Flexible Duty" standard) and Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967) (negligence sufficient), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
with Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361 (10th Cir. 1974) (an element of scienter or conscious
fault), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) and Lanta v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d
Cir. 1973).
44. 425 U.S. at 199.
45. 97 S.Ct. at 1300.
46. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in the instant case, see Rosenfeld,
An Essay in Support of the Second Circuit's Decisions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 5 HoFsrRA L. REv. Ill (1976); Comment, supra note 9.
47. 97 S.Ct. at 1302.
48. Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in all but the policy part of the opinion
and filed separate opinions. Justice Brennan was the lone dissenter and would have affirmed
for "substantially the reasons stated in the majority and concurring opinions in the Court
of Appeals." Id. at 1304.
49. Id. at 1300.
50. Id. at 1301.
51. Id. at 1300 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 189 (1976)). In
Hochfelder, the Court was critical of the position taken by the SEC that the investor
was injured regardless of whether the conduct of the defendant was intentional or negligent.

425 US. at 189.
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or omission of any material fact.5 2 The provisions of the Delaware shortform merger statute were met in full and the minority stockholders were
provided with all relevant information, including the available state appraisal
remedy.53 Further, the Court reasoned that the transaction was not manipulative.5 4 Referring to a characterization of manipulation as "virtually a term of
art"5 5 in securities litigation, the majority restricted the term to practices
that are calculated to mislead investors by artificially affecting securities prices. 56
The policy arguments advanced in the final section. of the opinion- z
demonstrated the Court's attempt to balance the implementation of the basic
purposes of the rule against interference with traditional state functions.58
While acknowledging that the existence of a state remedy does not preclude
a concurrent federal remedy,55 the Court was reluctant to expand jurisdiction of the federal courts where it "would overlap and . . . possibly interfere
with state corporate law. ' ' 60 Finally, because corporations are primarily
"creatures of state law," the Court was unwilling to federalize substantial
portions of corporate law in the absence of a clear expression of congressional
intent.61
The decision in the instant case reflected a shift of emphasis on the part
of the Court from effectuation of the purposes of securities legislation to
strict statutory construction. 62 The crux of the decision was that fraud cannot
exist under the rule without manipulation or deception.63 The Court's conclusion that there was no deception in the instant case is justified. 64 When full
disclosure is present, an allegation of deception will not withstand scrutiny.

52. 97 S. Ct. at 1301. The district court had made a specific finding, undisturbed by
the court of appeals, that there was neither misstatement nor omission by petitioners. Id.
53. Id. The Court stressed that the choice was fairly presented to respondents and
that they had all relevant information necessary to formulate their decision whether to
accept the cash offer or pursue appraisal remedies. Id.
54. Id. at 1302.
55. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
56. 97 S. Ct. at 1302. The Court discussed such practices as wash sales, matched orders,
and rigged prices as examples of manipulative conduct within the rule, and noted that
nondisclosure is generally essential to any manipulative scheme. Id.
57. Id. The Court found the statutory language analysis dispositive of the case but added
a discussion of policy because of "additional considerations" that "weigh heavily" against
allowance of this cause of action. Id.
58. Id. at 1303.
59. Id. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 97 S. Ct. 926, 949 (1977) (Congress is free
to create a remedial scheme in favor of contestants in tender offers); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (courts have a duty to provide remedies necessary to effectuate the
congressional purposes).
60. 97 S. Ct. at 1303.
61. Id. at 1304.
62. See id. at 1301. The Court, however, was still concerned with what it perceived
to be the fundamental purpose of the statute, the substitution of full disclosure for caveat
emptor. This was a substantial departure from the "remedial purposes" analysis of previous
cases. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
63. Id.
64. See note 52 supra.
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This interpretation is also consistent with prior decisions that65allowed l0b-5
actions only when some form of nondisclosure was involved.
Manipulation, as a term of art in securities markets, now carries a specific
meaning. 60 The Court stressed the congressional choice of this term of art,
despite the lack of evidence that Congress intended it as such. 67 The connotations presently given to manipulation are the result of judicial interpretation
rather than legislative design. The conduct alleged in the instant case is not,
however, the normal type of conduct that is considered manipulative by the
courts.68

The Court did overlook one possible basis for the inclusion of petitioner's
conduct within the purview of the rule. Though not mentioned by the circuit
court or in the complaint, the well-recognized doctrine of constructive fraud 69
includes injury to the weaker party by breach of a fiduciary relationship
without misrepresentation.-0 Subsection (c) of the rule71 would seem to encompass constructive fraud since it proscribes conduct that "operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." 72 The existence of a fiduciary
relationship in the instant case is uncontroverted. 73 If petitioner's conduct
amounted to a breach of that relationship, a less restrictive interpretation
74
of the rule could justifiably provide a federal remedy.
Although the Court was obviously concerned with the flood of litigation
that would inundate the federal courts if the rule were extended75 its policy
65. The Court rejected all of the cases relied upon by respondent and the court of
appeals on this basis. 97 S. Ct. at 1301 & n.15.
66. Wxnn.ra's THnD INTERNATiONAL DxcrnoNAxY 1376 (3d ed. 1971) defines "manipulate"

in relation to securities markets as "to force prices up or down, as by matched orders,
wash sales, fictitious reports, or similar methods."
67. The only specific reference to §10b in the Senate Report on the 1934 Act merely

stated that the section was "aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which
have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,

6 (1934).
68. See generally Jacobs, Regulation of Manipulation by SEC Rule 10b-5, 18 N.Y.L.F.
511, 515-56 (1973).
69. Cacy v. United States, 298 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1961) (when concealment is
present, conduct is actual, not constructive fraud); Seag-rave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d
389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954) (constructive fraud exists with breach of a fiduciary relationship
without elements of traditional fraud); Steele v. Steele, 295 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (S.D. W. Va.

1969) (constructive fraud exists without dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive).
70. Two decisions have recognized the constructive fraud doctrine in lob-5 cases. de
Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834, 837 (D. Colo. 1969) (constructive fraud
in unfair merger with full disclosure); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp.
757, 772-73 (D. Colo. 1964) (constructive fraud cognizable under lOb-5).

71. See note 2 supra.
72. See 2 A. BROmBERG, supra note 18, §8.4(620), at 204.241 (Supp. 1971), which states:
"These terms typically refer to unconscionable transactions by a fiduciary (broadly defined)
at the expense of his beneficiary.... Constructive or equitable fraud, as a species of fraud,
is rarely mentioned in Rule lob-5 cases, but is apparently encompassed by the Rule."

73. 97 S. Ct. at 1302.
74. Cf. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 884 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Controlling shareholders have a duty not to take advantage of the minority in purchasing

the latter's shares.").
75. 97 S. Ct. at 1303. The Court was concerned with the difficulty of distinguishing
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arguments centered on the existence of a state remedy and interference with
an area of state law.7 6 While the problem of overcrowded federal courts would
no doubt be exacerbated, the Court displayed an alarming callousness toward
the fundamental fairness of the transaction. 77 The adequacy of the appraisal
remedy, though not questioned by the Court, is suspect.7 1 Appraisal remedies
have been criticized as illusory since the cost of providing experts and sustaining litigation is often either out of proportion with amount of recovery or
out of reach of the ordinary plaintiff. 9 Laws that make it relatively easy to
eliminate minority interests, particularly the Delaware law,"" illustrate the
pro-management bias that results from states competing to attract corporations."' Federal securities laws were created to regulate this competition, as
well as to protect investors and to inspire confidence in securities markets.8 2
If the state appraisal remedy is indeed inadequate, the Court in the instant
8 3
case is impeding the purpose of federal securities regulations.
The Court's concern for the usurpation of state court functions 4 seems
misplaced in view of the tendency of all securities regulations to interfere with
state law to some extent.85 When state competition for corporate domicile
results in inequitable laws, federal securities regulations are necessitated.8 6
In response to such inequities, the Court did recognize a potential need for
8
The Court was unwilling, however, to stretch
federal fiduciary principlesY.
existing rules to create new causes of action where Congress has failed to
act.88
There is justification for the Court's strict interpretation of the statutory
language. A clearer definition of actionable conduct would benefit not only
between the use of a short-form merger to eliminate the minority at an unfair price and
the use of other devices such as long-form mergers and tender offers. The result would
be a "danger of vexatious litigation . . . from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs." Id.
76. ld.
77. Justice Blackmun voiced a similar concern in his dissent in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting): "The Court
exhibits a preternatural solicitousness for corporate well being and a seeming callousness
toward the investing public."
IN

78.
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H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 1411, 1422 (1938-1940).
79. Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 124-26.
80. DEL. CODE tit. 8, §262 (1975). See note 7 supra.
81. Bahlman, supra note 22, at 730.
82. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194. For a discussion of the impact of
this case, see Commentary, Rule 10b-5: Liability for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 999 (1976).
83. See 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 18, §12.5, at 275-76, which states: "Implicit or
The problem
explicit in all the other manifestations of lOb-5 is the concept of fairness ....
becomes one of fair value or price (particularly for closely held securities) and excess
of influencing factors."

84.
85.
86.

97 S. Ct. at 1304.
Bahlman, supranote 22, at 734.
See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,

83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).

87.
88.

97 S. Ct. at 1304.
Id.
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